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SEALING THE COFFIN ON THE EXPERIMENTAL USE 
EXCEPTION  
In a petition for writ of certiorari, Duke University requests that the 
Supreme Court reverse a Federal Circuit holding that, in its view, “seals 
the coffin on the experimental use exception for private universities.”1 
This iBrief discusses the Federal Circuit’s decision in Madey v. Duke 
University2 and its possible effects on the progress of science. 
On October 3, 2002, the Court of Appeals for the Federal Circuit (“CAFC”) held that the 
district court improperly awarded Duke University (“Duke”) partial summary judgment in a 
patent infringement suit brought against Duke by John M.J. Madey (“Madey”), a former 
professor and head of the free electron laser (“FEL”) lab at Duke.3  In its finding, the district court 
relied on the experimental use defense to patent infringement.4  The CAFC held that “the district 
court [had] applied an overly broad version of the very narrow experimental use defense [that 
was] inconsistent with [the CAFC’s] precedent[,]”5 and remanded the case for application of the 
proper standard.6   
The CAFC held that the “very narrow and strictly limited experimental use defense” 
applies only if use of the patented invention is “solely for amusement, to satisfy idle curiosity, or 
for strictly philosophical inquiry,” and that the defense does not apply if the use is “in furtherance 
of the alleged infringer’s legitimate business[.]”7  This is true regardless of the “profit or non-
profit” status of the user and “regardless of whether a particular institution or entity is engaged in 
an endeavor for commercial gain[.]”8  This portion of the decision has caused numerous 
universities and non-profit organizations such as the Association of American Medical Colleges, 
the Association of American Universities, Consumer Project on Technology, a public interest 
non-profit organization founded by Ralph Nader, and Public Knowledge, a public interest 
advocacy organization, to seek Supreme Court intervention.  They argue that the holding “erects a 
                                                     
1 Petition for a Writ of Cert. at 14, Madey v. Duke University, 307 F. 3d 1351 (Fed. Cir. 2002) 
(No. 02-1007). 
2 Madey v. Duke University, 307 F.3d 1351 (Fed. Cir. 2002). 
3 Id. at 1352-53. 
4 Madey v. Duke University, No. 1:97CV1170, slip op. at 12-15, 18, 20 (M.D.N.C. June 15, 
2001) (“Summary Judgment Opinion”). 
5 Madey, 307 F.3d at 1360. 
6 Id. at 1362-63. 
7 Id. at 1362. 
8 Id. 
significant roadblock to the advancement of science” because of the “chilling effect [it will have] 
on all academic scientific research.”9  
Background 
Facts 
In 1988, Madey left Stanford University to assume a position as professor in Duke’s 
physics department.10  Shortly thereafter, Duke built an addition to its physics building in order to 
house Madey’s FEL lab.11  Contained in the lab are several pieces of equipment that practice the 
subject matter disclosed and claimed in two patents owned by Madey: U.S. Patent No. 4,641,103 
(“the ‘103 patent”), which covers a “Microwave Electron Gun” and U.S. Patent No., 5,130,994 
(“the ‘994 patent”) titled “Free-Electron Laser Oscillator For Simultaneous Narrow Spectral 
Resolution And Fast Time Resolution Spectroscopy.”12 
Madey worked at Duke for nearly a decade but resigned in 1998 after being removed as 
lab director.13  Madey claims that his removal was predicated on his refusal to use the “lab’s 
equipment for research areas outside the allocated scope of certain government funding[.]”14  
Despite Madey’s removal from the lab, Duke continued to use some of the lab’s equipment, 
including the equipment embodying Madey’s patents.  Because of this unauthorized use of 
Madey’s patents, Madey sued Duke for patent infringement.15   
District Court 
The district court granted Duke’s motion to dismiss the infringement claims under Rule 
12(b)(1) of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure for lack of subject matter jurisdiction,16 but 
denied Duke’s motion under Rule 12(b)(6) for failure to state a claim upon which relief can be 
granted.17  In a motion for summary judgment, however, Duke claimed that its use of Madey’s 
patent was exempted from a claim of patent infringement based on the experimental nature of its 
                                                     
9 Brief of Amici Curiae Association of American Medical Colleges, et al. at 3-4, Madey v. Duke 
University, 307 F. 3d 1351 (Fed. Cir. 2002) (No. 02-1007). 
10 Madey, 307 F.3d at 1352. 
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12 Id. at 1352-53. 
13 Id.  
14 Id. at 1352. 
15 Id. at 1353. 
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a patentee’s remedy for unauthorized use of his/her patent for the United States is an action 
against the United States in the US Court of Federal Claims).   
use, and the district court agreed.  Duke’s motion for summary judgment based on the defense of 
experimental use was granted.18  The court held that “the defense was viable for experimental, 
non-profit purposes” and placed the burden on Madey to “establish that [Duke’s] use of the patent 
had ‘definite, cognizable, and not insubstantial commercial purposes.’”19 
The district court rejected Madey’s evidence of commercial use as “mere speculation” 
and held that Madey “failed to meet his burden of proof to create a genuine issue of material 
fact.”20  The holding was in reliance on Duke’s patent policy which states that Duke is “dedicated 
to teaching, research, and the expansion of knowledge … [and] does not undertake research or 
development work principally for the purpose of developing patents and commercial 
applications.”21  The court found that these statements refuted any contention that Duke was in 
the business of developing technology for commercial applications.22 
Experimental Use 
Article I, Section 8, Clause 8 of the United States Constitution provides that: 
The Congress shall have the Power … To promote the Progress of 
Science and useful Arts, by securing for limited Times to Authors and 
Inventors the exclusive Right to their respective Writings and 
Discoveries. 
In order to secure this limited but exclusive right to inventors, Congress enacted the Patent Act, 
which provides, in part, that: 
[W]hoever without authority makes, uses, offers to sell, or sells any 
patented invention, within the United States or imports into the United 
States during the term of the patent thereof, infringes the patent.23 
In recognition of the desire to protect a patentee’s interests while avoiding the enactment 
of laws that would stifle the progress of science, an exception to liability for patent infringement 
was created for use that is for mere experimentation.  The origin of the experimental use defense 
is linked to an opinion by Supreme Court Justice Story; in Whittemore v. Cutter24 he stated: 
[I]t could never have been the intention of the legislature to punish a man 
who constructed such a machine merely for philosophical experiments, 
                                                                                                                                                              
17 Id. at 1353 (citing Dismissal Opinion at 9 n. 2). 
18 Id. at 1355 (citing Summary Judgment at 9). 
19 Id. (citing Summary Judgment at 9-10 (citing Roche Prods., Inc. v. Bolar Pharm. Co., 733 F.2d 
858, 863 (Fed. Cir. 1984)). 
20 Id. (citing Summary Judgment at 12). 
21 Id. (citing Summary Judgment at 11). 
22 Id. (citing Summary Judgment at 12). 
23 35 U.S.C. § 271(a). 
24 Whittemore v. Cutter, 29 Fed. Cas. 1120, 1121 (C.C.D. Mass. 1813). 
or for the purpose of ascertaining the sufficiency of the machine to 
produce its described effects. 
By 1861 it was well accepted that “an experiment with a patented article for the sole purpose of 
gratifying a philosophical taste, or curiosity, or for mere amusement is not an infringement of the 
rights of the patentee.”25  When an invention is “made or used as an experiment, whether for the 
gratification of scientific tastes, or for curiosity, or for amusement, the interests of the patentee 
are not antagonized[.]”26 
The exception was held to be “truly narrow” by the CAFC in Roche Products, Inc. v. 
Bolar Pharmaceuticals Co., Inc.27  In Roche, the court held that the experimental use rule could 
not be construed so broadly “as to allow a violation of the patent laws in the guise of ‘scientific 
inquiry,’ when that inquiry has definite, cognizable, and not insubstantial commercial purposes.28  
The defense is also limited to “tests, demonstrations, and experiments” not “in keeping with the 
legitimate business” of the alleged infringer.29     
The only case to address the experimental use of a patented invention by a non-profit 
educational institution is Ruth v. Stearns-Rogers Mfg. Co.30 In Ruth, a Colorado district court held 
that the experimental use defense was available to manufacturers of mining and milling 
machinery against a claim of contributory infringement since the end-user/purchaser was the 
Colorado School of Mines.31  It held that “[t]he making or using of a patented invention merely 
for experimental purposes, without any intent to derive profits or practical advantage therefrom, 
is not infringement.32 
CAFC’s Decision 
The CAFC held that the district court had applied an overly broad version of the 
experimental use defense and remanded for application of the narrower version set out in its 
opinion.  However, it is arguable whether there is anything for the district court to do on remand 
other than to find the defense unavailable to Duke, since, according to the Court, “Duke’s acts 
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26 W. Robinson, The Law of Patents for Useful Inventions § 898 (1890). 
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30 Ruth v. Stearns-Rogers Mfg. Co., 13 F. Supp. 697 (D. Colo. 1935). 
31 Id. at 713. 
32 Id. 
appear to be in accordance with any reasonable interpretation of Duke’s legitimate business 
objectives.”33  
The CAFC further held that no “conduct that is in keeping with the alleged infringer’s 
legitimate business, regardless of commercial implications[,]” is immunized from a claim of 
patent infringement.34  It went on to state that the sanctioning and funding of research projects 
with arguably no commercial application whatsoever by institutions such as Duke “unmistakably 
further the institution’s business objectives, including educating and enlightening students and 
faculty participating in these projects.”35  In the view of the CAFC, “the district court attached too 
great a weight to the non-profit, educational status of Duke.”36 
The CAFC dismissed Ruth’s reliance on the combination of “apparent lack of 
commerciality, with the non-profit status of the educational institution” as “not consistent with 
the binding precedent or [its] case law[.]” The Court thereby held that such reliance cannot serve 
as the sole basis for holding that the experimental use defense applied “without any detailed 
analysis of the character, nature and effect of the use[.]”37   
The basic rule established by the Court was that: 
[R]egardless of whether a particular institution or entity is engaged in an 
endeavor for commercial gain, so long as the act is in furtherance of the 
alleged infringer’s legitimate business and is not solely for amusement, 
to satisfy idle curiosity, or for strictly philosophical inquiry, the act does 
not qualify for the very narrow and strictly limited experimental use 
defense.  Moreover, the profit or non-profit status of the user is not 
determinative.38 
In this holding, therefore, the Court shifted the focus of the experimental use defense from the 
commercial versus noncommercial nature of the experimentation and the profit versus non-profit 
status of the alleged infringer to merely a question of whether the use was in furtherance of the 
alleged infringer’s legitimate business. 
Arguments for Broader Version of Exemption 
Chilling Effect on Academic Scientific Research  
Duke argues that the CAFC’s decision “effectively eliminate[s] the experimental use 
exception for research institutions” since “[n]o  research institution will be able to demonstrate 
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that its experimental use of any patent fails to further the institution’s ‘legitimate business.’”39  In 
so doing, the holding disrupts the “balance between the need to promote innovation and the 
recognition that imitation and refinement through imitation are necessary to invention itself” 
which is embodied in the federal patent laws40 and overrides “Congress’ legislative judgment” 
turning  “the experimental use exception on its head.”41   
Without the experimental exemption, research institutions like Duke will be at the mercy 
of patent holders.  “This ‘proliferation of intellectual property rights’ now allows each individual 
patent holder ‘to set up another tollbooth’ delaying or even blocking further research 
innovation.”42  These “tollbooths” consist of license agreements that will have to be agreed upon 
for each of the patents underlying a contemplated research project.  This increases both the cost 
and duration of valuable research.  A significant threat is that “uncooperative patent holder[s will] 
demand[] unreasonable returns in exchange for the right to use a particular patent.”43  
Experiments may be precluded altogether if the patentee refuses to license use of his or her 
patented invention.  Researchers may be forced to stop in the middle of a project upon the 
realization that a new patent has been implicated in the course of their experimentation.  Other 
concerns for research institutions include “administrative and financial costs to cover patent 
searches, infringement opinions, … and the inevitable litigation.”44   
This result “threatens to delay or stymie research”45 conducted by such institutions, 
inevitably affecting scientific progress in general.  Non-profit educational institutions like Duke 
conduct a significant portion of the research and development crucial to scientific progress.  
Approximately 43% of all basic research is conducted in universities.46  It is this basic research, 
as opposed to more targeted and focused research, that contributes to important discoveries and 
inventions.  For example, in its Amici Curiae submitted to the Supreme Court in support of Duke, 
Consumer Project on Technology (CPT) and Public Knowledge (PK) cited a brochure entitled 
Why Do Basic Research? published by the National Institute General Medical Sciences, National 
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Institute of Health.47  The brochure documents the results of a study in which 90 physicians were 
asked to “list the top 10 developments in cardiovascular-pulmonary medicine.”48  The roots of the 
medical breakthroughs were then traced, and it was found that “42 percent of the conceptual steps 
in the development of the 10 most important medical treatments” came from basic researchers.49 
“This nation has benefited enormously in the past from noncommercial academic 
scientific research, as more discoveries and greater understanding of the unknown have facilitated 
commercial research leading to new and socially beneficial products and applications.”50  “The 
[CAFC’s] decision … threatens to stifle that research and thereby endanger this nation’s 
continued leadership in science and technology.”51   
CAFC Ignores History of Experimental Use Exemption as Applied to Non-Profit 
Researchers Conducting Non-Commercial Experiments 
The Association of American Medical Colleges, the American Council on Education, 
various individual colleges, universities and medical schools, and several other organizations 
argue that the CAFC’s decision is in contrast to the historical exemption that non-profit 
educational institutions enjoyed when their research was noncommercial.52  They claim that “[i]n 
determining the type of ‘experimental use’ entitled to exemption, courts historically drew the line 
between commercial and noncommercial research.”53  In their Amici Curiae in support of Duke, 
these various organizations cite a study “based upon ‘70 interviews with personnel at 
biotechnology and pharmaceutical firms and universities’” that, to them  
confirms that ‘university researchers, to the extent that they are doing 
noncommercial work, are largely left alone’ and that in those rare 
instances when universities received letters alleging infringement ‘the 
typical response was effectively to ignore such letters and inform the 
[patent] holder that the university was engaged in research, did not intend 
to threaten the firm’s commercial interests, and would not cease its 
research.’54 
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Duke also argues that it was the “long-settled expectations of the scientific community … 
that non-profit research institutions may make experimental use of patented inventions without 
running afoul of the patent law”55 and that a “universal assumption among universities and 
academic researchers was that the experimental use exception permitted non-profit researchers to 
conduct non-commercial experiments without regard to possible patent infringement.”56  The 
Supreme Court, in Festo Corporation. v. Skoketsu Kinzoku Kogyo Kabushki Co. Ltd., held that 
Congress alone has the responsibility for making fundamental changes to settled law, since such 
changes “risk destroying the legitimate expectations” of the investing community.57  Arguable, 
the CAFC ignored this proscription with regards to the scope of the experimental use defense, 
thus warranting Supreme Court intervention. 
Conclusion 
In recognition of the goal of promoting the progress of science, it has been well settled that 
individuals who use a patented invention without authorization will be able to escape liability for 
infringement if that use is merely for experiment and produces no pecuniary result.  The 
exception has been held to be quite narrow, but prior to the CAFC’s decision, has been based 
primarily on the commercial versus noncommercial implications of the research and the profit 
versus non-profit status of the alleged infringer.  
Arguably, the CAFC has deviated from the history of the experimental use exception 
disrupting the “settled expectations of the inventing community[.]”58  The impact that this 
decision will have on basic research, and in turn scientific progress, is yet to be determined.  
However, it is clear that, under the CAFC’s new test, universities and non-profit organizations 
now face numerous additional obstacles to their performance of basic research, and it is this result 
and the fear that such a result will inevitably stifle the progress of science that has incited much 
outcry from the scientific community. 
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